We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974) , with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multivalued.
Introduction
One of the most important models in the theory of the trade of indivisible goods was put forward by Shapley and Scarf (1974) . In this game, there are n players (or agents), each initially endowed with his own single indivisible good, e.g. a house. The houses are differentiated, meaning that different players may value different houses differently.
Players' valuations for houses are expressed as complete, transitive preference orderings.
In addition, it is assumed that each player only has use for one house. Hence the only moves possible for the players in the game are to swap houses amongst themselves, in some mutually beneficial way.
The simple market of trade outlined above gives rise to an ordinal preference game, and Shapley-Scarf's remarkable result is that this game always has a nonempty core. In fact, if no indifference is allowed in any of the players' preferences, it turns out that the strict core is also nonempty, consisting of a single allocation of the houses (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) . This allocation can be found using the top trading cycle algorithm (TTCA). In this procedure, we initially form a directed graph in which there are n vertices, one for each player. An edge exists from vertex i to vertex j if player i's most preferred house is the one originally owned by player j. It is easy to see that this digraph must have a cycle, and that this cycle defines a "houseswap" among some of the players of the game.
Assign the houses according to this "top trading cycle", and remove the corresponding players (and their houses) from consideration. Now do the same thing with the remaining players: define a digraph in which edge ij exists if and only if i's most preferred house (out of the ones remaining in the game) is the one originally owned by j. Again there must be a top trading cycle, etc. At the end of this process there will be an ordered list of top trading cycles, and the corresponding assignment is the unique strict core allocation.
However, the above analysis on the strict core breaks down if we allow players to be indifferent between houses. Indeed, it is easy to construct examples (with indifferences allowed) in which there are no strict core allocations 1 or to construct examples with multiple strict core outcomes. So the question becomes: how can we tell if a houseswapping game (with indifference allowed) has an empty strict core, singleton strict core, or multi-valued strict core? This is the main question which concerns us in this paper.
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To answer this question, we define the notion of a top trading segmentation (TTS).
A TTS is an ordered partition {T 1 , ..., T m } of the players with the properties that for each 1 Shapley-Scarf give such an example in their 1974 paper. We re-use their example as Example 4.3 in this paper.
2 Wako (1984) provides a few other results for the model where indifference is allowed. In particular, he gives an example in which the strict core is a nonempty proper subset of the set of competitive allocations, and proves that the strict core is in general a subset of the set of competitive allocations. segment T j , (a) for each player in T j , all of his most-preferred houses (among the ones originally owned by members of T j ∪ T j+1 ∪ ... ∪ T m ) are originally owned by members of segment T j ; (b) no proper subset of T j satisfies (a); and (c) there is a cyclical swap of houses within segment T j such that every player in T j can actually get one of his "mostpreferred" houses. We note that in the case where there are no indifferences in the players' preferences, the list of top-trading-cycles generated by the TTCA satisfies the definition of a TTS.
Our first main result is that in a houseswapping game (with indifference allowed), the strict core is nonempty if and only if a TTS exists. In addition, the cyclical swaps associated with the segments in a TTS give a strict core allocation. Hence, we generalize the previous results for the case where no indifference is allowed.
Second, we use the theory of TTS's to formulate an O(n 3 ) algorithm which takes as input a houseswapping game, and outputs either a strict core allocation or else a report that the strict core is empty.
Third, we use the notion of TTS to re-prove the result of Wako (1991) and Ma (1994) that strict core outcomes, if they exist, are unique in terms of utility payoffs for the players.
Finally, we formulate a system of linear inequalities, called "CLIS", whose feasible region's extreme points exactly correspond to the strict core allocations of the game. Hence, in the case where no indifference is allowed (and thus the strict core contains precisely one allocation), the feasible region is exactly one point; in the cases where the strict core is empty, CLIS is an infeasible program. Hence we have a natural analogue to linear systems presented by Vande Vate (1989) and Rothblum (1991) for the marriage game of Gale-Shapley (1962) .
Preliminaries in Graph Theory
We begin with some background in the theory of directed graphs. A directed graph, or digraph for short, is a pair (V, E) where V is a set of vertices and E a set of directed edges. A (directed) edge in turn is an ordered pair (i, j) with i, j ∈ V , and thus E is a subset of {(i, j) | i ∈ V and j ∈ V }. Given a digraph (V, E) and a vertex i ∈ V , we denote by Γ i the set of vertices pointed to by outgoing edges from i, i.e., Γ i := {j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ E}. In fact, we may alternatively define a digraph by the pair (V, {Γ i } i∈V ).
If V is a particular subset of V , then the subgraph of G induced by V is the subgraph with vertex set V and edge set E = {(i, j) ∈ E : i ∈ V and j ∈ V }.
A sequence of vertices
A cycle is a path in which m ≥ 2 and i 1 = i m .
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Both a path and a cycle can be regarded as subgraphs (but not necessarily induced subgraphs) of the whole digraph G.
is an ij-path. If V ⊆ V , we say V is strongly connected if the subgraph of G induced by V is strongly connected. Equivalently, V is strongly connected if for any i, j ∈ V there is an ij-path {i 1 = i, ..., i m = j} in which i k ∈ V ∀k.
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Proposition 2.1. Let G = (V, E) be a digraph, and suppose V ⊆ V is strongly connected in G. Let i ∈ V . Then there exists a cycle (within V ) which contains i.
Next, we define a concept which is crucial in Section 4. A minimal self-mapped
Since a subgraph is a digraph, this implies that all edges of E consist of vertex pairs in V .
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In some texts, a directed path is defined as an alternating sequence of vertices and edges (see e.g., Roberts (1984) ). However, the list of edges is superfluous, and so one may simply define a path as just a sequence of vertices, as we do here.
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The m ≥ 2 condition implies that a singleton vertex {i} is not a cycle. But {i, i} is a cycle if (i, i) ∈ E.
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Note that this definition does not rule out i = j; hence, in order for a singleton vertex {i} to be considered as strongly connected, the edge (i, i) must be present.
(1) C = i∈C Γ i , and [self-mappedness] (2) ∃S with ∅ = S ⊂ C and S = i∈S Γ i .
[minimality]
Proposition 2.2. Let G = (V, {Γ i } i∈V ) be a digraph, and suppose V ⊆ V satisfies a) V is strongly connected and b)
Proof. The strong connectedness of V implies that V ⊆ i∈V Γ i , while condition b)
implies i∈V Γ i ⊆ V ; taken together these imply self-mappedness (1). Now suppose there was a nonempty proper subset of V of V which was also self-mapped. Then there would be no path from vertex i ∈ V to vertex j ∈ V \ V , thereby violating V 's strong connectedness. Hence V also satisfies (2).
at least one minimal self-mapped set.
Proof. We prove the Lemma by presenting an algorithm which takes as input the directed graph G, and outputs a minimal self-mapped set:
Step 1 (Finding a directed cycle) (1.0) All vertices in V are colored "blue". Pick any vertex in V and let i 1 denote it.
Vertex i 1 is now "red". Set t = 1.
(1.1) If Γ i t = {i t }, then go to Step 3. Otherwise, let i t+1 be a vertex in Γ i t which is different from i t , and set f (i t ) = i t+1 .
(1.2) If i t+1 is colored "red", i.e. i t+1 = i k for some k ∈ 1, ..., t − 1, trace out the cycle C = {i k , ..., i t } using function f , and go to Step 2. If i t+1 is colored "blue", recolor it "red", then set t = t + 1 and return to Step 1.1.
Step 2 (Contracting the digraph using input cycle
(2.5) Return to Step 1.
Step 3 (End) The elements of L(i t ) are the vertices that form a minimal self-mapped
Let us analyze this algorithm. First, note that every time we enter Step 1, it is with a digraph satisfying Γ j = ∅ for all j ∈ V (we assume this to be true in the original digraph; also, the digraph-contraction steps (2.2)-(2.4) do not alter this property). Hence, if the algorithm does not immediately go to Step 3 to terminate, the "path following" sub-algorithm (1.1)-(1.2) must yield a cycle. By virtue of the i t+1 = i t assumption in (1.1), this cycle contains at least two vertices -and this in turn implies that at least one vertex is contracted out of the digraph during each pass through Step 2. Hence, after at most n − 1 iterations of Steps 1 and 2, we will be down to one vertex and so the algorithm will terminate. Now let us consider the outcome of the algorithm produced at Step 3. First we note that the elements of L(i t ) comprise either a single cycle or else a concatenation of cycles;
hence L(i t ) is strongly connected. Next note that in order to move to Step 3 we must have
Step (1.1). Hence L(i t ) must also satisfy condition b) of Proposition 2.2, and so is a minimal self-mapped set.
and suppose
S is a minimal self-mapped set of G. Then S is strongly connected.
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Proof. Since S is a minimal self-mapped set, it has no subsets which are self-mapped.
Hence, if we consider the subgraph G S of G induced by the vertices in S, then the only minimal self-mapped set of G S is S itself. This in turn implies that if we run algorithm MSMS with input digraph G S , it must return S itself.
However, we argued in the proof of Lemma 2.3 that the output of algorithm MSMS is strongly connected; hence S is strongly connected. Proof. Since S = T , we may assume without loss of generality that there exists a vertex j which is an element of S but not T . Now suppose the Corollary was false, i.e. ∃i ∈ S ∩ T .
Since i and j are both in S, Lemma 2.4 implies there is a path from i to j. But i ∈ T and j ∈ T ; hence there is an edge along this path connecting a vertex of T to a vertex not in T . This contradicts T 's self-mappedness.
Lemma 2.7. The computational complexity of algorithm MSMS is O(|V | 2
).
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From this lemma and Proposition 2.2 it is easy to show that the converse of Proposition 2.2 holds.
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Here C is a cycle and S is a subset of V . Although technically C is an ordered set of vertices and S is unordered, we shall use the notation C ⊆ S to mean that the set of vertices in C is a subset of S. This notation comes up again in the "only if" portion of the proof of Theorem 5.5.
Proof. Let v = |V |. It is clear that the cycle-building Step 1 is O(v) for each pass through
Step 1; since the algorithm passes through Step 1 no more than n times, the number of total steps spent in this phase is O(v 2 ). Now let us consider a particular single pass (say, the qth pass) through Step 2, with "input cycle" C q . The re-labeling step (2.1) is
Steps (2.2) 
The Houseswapping Market
We consider a market in which there are n players, each endowed with one indivisible good, e.g., a house. Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of players. The indivisible goods are differentiated, and the endowment of player i is called "house i". Thus N also denotes the set of houses in the market. The players each try to engineer "house-swaps" with other players in an effort to obtain the best possible house in the market. The end result is an allocation, which is a one-to-one assignment of houses to players. Formally, an allocation is a bijection Suppose µ is an allocation. A coalition S is said to block µ if there exists an S-
A core allocation is an allocation which is not blocked by any S, while a strict core allocation is an allocation which is not weakly blocked by any S. The (regular)
core of market M is the set of all core allocations, and the strict core of market M is the set of all strict core allocations. These are the usual core and strict core solution concepts from cooperative game theory.
Finally, we note the connection between the concept of S-allocation and those of digraph and cycle discussed in the last section. For each S-allocation π S , we define the
This digraph consists solely of vertex disjoint cycles, covering the vertices in S. If the corresponding digraph to π S consists of exactly one cycle, we call π S a simple S-allocation. Let Π 0 S be the set of simple S-allocations for a given S. Conversely, if digraph G = (S, {Γ i } i∈S ) consists only of vertex disjoint cycles, one may define its corresponding S-allocation to be the S-allocation π S given by {π S (i)} = Γ i for all i ∈ S.
A Fundamental Concept: The PMSS
Let M(N, ) be a houseswapping market. For each player i ∈ N and each coalition S ⊆ N , we define B i (S) to be the set of player i's most preferred items among those items
Let P denote the set of partitions of N . Definition 4.1. We call a partition T = {T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m } ∈ P a partition by minimal self-mapped sets (PMSS) if each T k ∈ T satisfies the following conditions:
In words, a PMSS is a division of the players in the game into ordered groups T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m . Condition (1) implies that for any player i in any group, the items he prefers most among those not in lower-index-numbered groups are all owned by players in his group. Hence, in this sense, we may regard groups with lower indices as "better" (or "more desirable"). In addition, the fact that (1) holds with equality implies that i's own item is on some member of his group's "most preferred" list. (1) 2 1 3 1 5 1 4 1 1 1 6 (2) 1 ∼ 2 3 2 4 2 6 2 5 2 2 (3) 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 5 3 6 (4) 2 4 5 4 6 4 3 4 4 4 1 (5) 1 ∼ 5 4 5 5 5 3 5 6 5 2 (6) 3 6 6 6 1 6 2 6 4 6 5. This example has two PMSS's:
B 4 ({4, 5, 6}) = {5} and B 5 ({4, 5, 6}) = {4}; and (c) ∪ i∈T 3 B i (N \(T 1 ∪ T 2 )) = T 3 follows from B 6 ({6}) = 6. It is also easy to verify from the listing of these B i 's that T satisfies condition (2) for a PMSS. Thus T is a PMSS. A similar argument shows that T is also a PMSS. These are the only two PMSS's for this example. (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) . Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of players who have the following preferences:
Here we see that there is only one nonempty set S for which ∪ i∈S B i (N ) = S, namely S = N . Hence the only possible "T 1 " in a PMSS would be T 1 = N . Indeed, T = {N } is the only PMSS in this example. Proof. We prove the Proposition by presenting an algorithm which takes as input any market M, and returns a PMSS for that market:
<<Algorithm PMSS >>
Step 0 (Initialization) The market M = (N, ) is given. Set V = N and k = 1.
Step 1 (Defining a digraph) For each j ∈ V , find the set
Step 2 (Finding a minimal self-mapped set) Find a minimal self-mapped set in digraph G by using the algorithm MSMS. Let T k denote the minimal self-mapped set.
Step 3 (Updating)
Step 4. Otherwise, set k = k + 1 and return to Step 1.
Step 4 (End) Let T be the ordered set {T 1 , . . . , T k * } of the minimal self-mapped sets Step 3 is O(n). Since PMSS terminates after no more than n iterations, it must have complexity O(n 3 ).
Segmentability of the Market
In this section we state necessary and sufficient conditions for a market to have a nonempty strict core.
Definition 5.1. i) A top trading segmentation (TTS) of market M is a partition
. . , T m } ∈ P that satisfies the following conditions:
The reader will note that conditions (1) and (2) above are almost by themselves the definition of PMSS (see Definition 4.1). In fact, we may more clearly see the relationship between the two concepts by noting the following:
Proof. From comparing the Lemma's conclusion with condition (1) for a TTS, it is sufficient to show that for each k, i∈T
But this follows, due to the presence of the supporting T k -allocation for segment T k .
Corollary 5.3. Every TTS is a PMSS. If T is a PMSS, then T is also a TTS if it satisfies condition (3) in the definition of TTS.
Corollary 5.3 suggests that in order to check whether a given PMSS T is a TTS, all we need do is see if each of its segments T k has a supporting T k -allocation. To do this, define for each T k the bipartite graph in which both parts have |T k | vertices, and an edge from i in the first part to j in the second part exists if and only if j ∈ B i (T k ). Now treat this as a "cardinality matching problem" (Lawler, p. 183, 195) . If the "maximal matching" contains 
, so we have
Lemma 5.4. The computational complexity to check if a given PMSS is a TTS is O(n 3
In section 4, we saw that we can think of a PMSS as a partition of players into groups, with lower-indexed groups being "better". The same interpretation holds for a TTS. Again, condition (1) means that for any player in any group, the items he prefers most among those not in better groups are all owned by players in his group. But in addition, condition (3) means that every player can get one of his most preferred items (among the items not in better groups) through a feasible exchange within his own group.
If a TTS exists in a market, then a player i within a certain group in the TTS would not have an incentive to trade with players in "worse" groups because such players' houses are strictly less preferred to what i can obtain by feasible exchange within his own group.
Nor would i trade with players in better groups because by the same logic, such players would not want to trade with him. He will thus accomplish a (second) best trade within his own group. In this sense, the market is segmented into distinct groups.
We should note that in the case where no player exhibits indifference, the partition of the market into "top trading cycles" fits the definition of a TTS.
At this point it is instructive to revisit Examples 4.2 and 4.3. In Example 4.2, we see that PMSS T = {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 } is also a TTS, because the supporting T k -allocations of segments T k , k = 1, 2, 3, are those corresponding to the cycles {1, 2, 3, 1}, {4, 5, 4}, and {6, 6} respectively. Note that in this example, there is exactly one strict core allocation, namely the N -allocation corresponding to the cycles {1, 2, 3, 1}, {4, 5, 4}, and {6, 6}. In the proof of Theorem 5.5 we will formalize this connection between strict core allocations and supporting allocations for TTS's.
In Example 4.3, we saw that there is only one PMSS, namely T = {N } = {{1, 2, 3}}.
But it is clear that since B 1 (N ) = B 3 (N ) = {2} and B 2 (N ) = {1, 3}, there is no Nallocation π N with π N (i) ∈ B i (N ) for i = 1, 2, 3. Hence there are is no TTS in this market. We also remark that Shapley and Scarf pointed out that the strict core is empty in this example.
In the following, we show that the existence of a TTS, i.e. the segmentability of a market, is a necessary and sufficient condition for the strict core to be nonempty.
Theorem 5.5. The strict core of market M(N, ) is nonempty if and only if a TTS exists.
Proof: (If part) We first prove that if a TTS exists, then the strict core is nonempty.
Let T = {T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m } be a TTS and π k ∈ Π T k , k = 1, . . . , m, supporting T k -allocations for the respective segments T k . Then for each k ∈ {1, . . . , m},
Let x be the allocation such that for each i ∈ N ,
is a strict core allocation. To prove this claim, we suppose that some coalition S weakly blocks x via the S-allocation π S . There are two cases: first, if π S maps each member of S to a house within that member's "group" of the TTS, then it is clearly impossible for π S to assign any member of S a better house than he gets from x; second, if π S maps some member of S to a house from a different group of the TTS, then it must assign to some member i ∈ S a house from a worse group. But then necessarily x(i) i π S (i), so it is impossible for S to weakly block x via π S after all.
(Only-if part) We suppose that the strict core is nonempty, and show this implies the existence of a TTS.
Let x be any strict core allocation and T = {T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m } be a PMSS of the market (a PMSS exists by virtue of Proposition 4.4). We now make the following claim:
Proof. To show the Claim, assume on the contrary that there exist k * ∈ {1, . . . , m} and
It follows from condition (1) of Definition 5.1 and (3) that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , k * − 1},
Since x is a permutation of N , it must hold that
We see that T k * ⊆ V and furthermore that T k * is a minimal self-mapped set of G. Since each Γ i (= B i (V )), i ∈ V , is nonempty, we can apply Corollary 2.5 to conclude that there exists a cycle C ⊆ T k * (see Footnote 8 in Section 2) as a subgraph of G, with i * ∈ C. Let S be set of vertices in C, and let π S be the corresponding simple S-allocation to C (see the discussion in Section 3). We have
It follows now from (4), (5), and (6) that
, and
namely, strict core allocation x is weakly blocked by coalition S. This is impossible. Thus the Claim must hold.
From Claim 5.6 and the fact that each T k ∈ T satisfies condition (1) of Definition 4.1, we see that for each i ∈ T k ,
Hence, since x is an allocation, we have x(T k ) = T k . So, for each T k , we can use x restricted to T k as a supporting T k -allocation for segment T k . This, together with the fact that T is a PMSS, shows that partition T is a TTS. The proof of Theorem 5.5 is complete. Proof. This is clear from the proof of Theorem 5.5. It is now a simple matter to present an algorithm which takes as input a houseswapping market M, and outputs a strict core allocation or else a report that the strict core is empty:
(2) Determine if T is a TTS by checking if every T k has a supporting T k -allocation π k .
(A) If "yes", by Corrolary 5.7 the allocation x defined by the π k 's is in the strict core.
(B) If "no", then T is not a TTS, Corollary 5.8 implies that there are no TTS's, and so the strict core is empty. 
Another Result regarding PMSS's
We now state another lemma concerning PMSS's, which will enable us to independently derive a result of Wako (1991) and Ma (1994) :
In short, Lemma 7.1 says that any two PMSS's must consist of the same sets, with only the order of those sets possibly being different. This again generalizes what we know to be true in the no-indifference case, where the listing of top trading cycles is unique, except possibly for changes in the order of the cycles.
In Example 4.2, it is easy to see that (1) and (2) hold, just from noticing that the
, 5}} consist of the same three sets.
Proof of Lemma 7.1. Before proceeding with the proof, we need to define a new con- Now suppose T 1 = T 1 . Then, since T 1 and T 1 are both minimal self-mapped sets in digraph (N, {B i (N )} i∈N ), Corollary 2.6 gives
. This in turn implies that, using algorithm PMSS 9 we can form a PMSS T for market M −T 1 , with T 1 = T 1 . On the other hand, the set T = {T 2 , ..., T k+1 } is also a PMSS for market M −T 1 , and T consists of k elements. Hence, by the inductive hypothesis T and T consist of the same sets, except possibly ordered differently. In particular, T 1 is an element of T .
Since T ⊆ T , T 1 ∈ T implies T 1 ∈ T . Hence, by Proposition 7.2 T \ T 1 is a PMSS for market M −T 1 , and this PMSS contains k elements. But T \ T 1 is also a PMSS for M −T 1 -so by the inductive hypothesis again the PMSS's T \ T 1 and T \ T 1 must consist of the same elements. Hence T and T also consist of the same elements.
We note that the concept of top preference digraph is well-defined due to Proposition 4.4 and Lemma 7.1. The figures below show the top preference digraphs for Examples 4.2 and 4.3:
We also observe that a market has a TTS (or, equivalently, a strict core allocation) if and only if its top preference digraph contains a subgraph which corresponds to an 9 Actually, we'd be using a modification of algorithm PMSS, where, instead of using algorithm MSMS to find an arbitrary minimal self-mapped set on the first pass through
Step 2, we'd just take T 1 . N -allocation. Such a subgraph exists in Figure 1 , but does not in Figure 2 .
Theorem 7.4 (Wako 1991 , Ma 1994 . Let x and y be two distinct strict core alloca-
Proof. From Corollary 5.7, strict core allocations x and y have their respective TTS's, which in turn are PMSS's. Lemma 7.1 implies these PMSS's are the same list of sets, say 
Strict Core and Linear Inequalities
In the study of Gale-Shapley's (1962) marriage game, some of the most interesting theoretical results are those which use polyhedral combinatorics to characterize the core.
In particular, given any marriage game G one may define a "marriage polytope" P (G) whose extreme points exactly correspond (in the natural way) with the elements of the game's core (see Vande Vate 1989 , Rothblum 1991 , Roth-Rothblum-Vande Vate 1993 , and Abeledo-Rothblum 1994 .
In this section we extend this idea to the realm of houseswapping games. Specifically, given a houseswapping market M, we define a "corresponding linear inequality system"
CLIS(M). We show CLIS(M)
is feasible if and only if the strict core of M is nonempty. (M) , to be the linear inequality system in x = (x ij ) i∈N,j∈N given by:
We see that any integer vector x that satisfies (7b), (7c) and (7d) has the following properties:
(1)
These properties show that x can be regarded as the N -allocation that maps each i ∈ N to the unique element j ∈ N with x ij = 1. We call the conditions (7b),(7c) and (7d) the allocation conditions or permutation conditions, and an integer vector satisfying these conditions an allocation vector or a permutation vector depending on the context.
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Given a permutation vector x = (x ij ) i∈N,j∈N , we can write it in function form by defining each x(i), i ∈ N , to be the element j ∈ N with x ij = 1. Conversely, given
x ∈ Π N , we can represent it in vector form by defining x ij := 1 for (i, j) ∈ N × N with
We use both notations together in an effort to clarify our exposition.
Lemma 8.1. Suppose that y = (y ij ) i∈N,j∈N is a strict core allocation vector of a market
M = (N, ). Then y is a feasible solution of CLIS(M).

10
In the economics/game theory context, the term "allocation" is natural because x represents a way to redistribute the indivisible goods in a market. In a mathematics context, the term "permutation" is natural because x represents a bijection of the set N = {1, ..., n} to itself.
Proof. Since y is an allocation vector, it satisfies the permutation conditions, i.e., (7b), 
We see that it is impossible for (8) to hold if there exists i ∈ S, j i π(i) with y ij = 1.
Hence, since y is a 0-1 vector, we have y ij = 0 for all (i, j) for which j i π(i). But this implies that (switching to the function form)
In addition, we note that it is impossible for π(i) ∼ i y(i) for all i ∈ S, because in that case (8) would hold with equality. Hence there must be some i * ∈ S for which π(i *
But this in combination with (9) implies that coalition S weakly blocks y via S-allocation π, so we have a contradiction.
Lemma 8.2. Suppose that x is a feasible solution of the CLIS of market M(N, ). Then
x is a convex combination of strict core allocation vectors. 
To see (10), suppose it were not true, i.e.,
Since T is a PMSS, we know
.., m} and t ∈ T l . By (11), we would have x k (t) ∈ T l for all l ∈ {1, ..., m} and t ∈ T l . Hence x k (T l ) = T l for each l ∈ {1, ..., m}. But this in combination with (11) would imply that T was a TTS whose segments are supported by allocation x k . Thus it follows from Corollary 5.7 that x k was a strict core allocation. This is a contradiction, and so (10) must be true. (1) for simplicity. We then see the following:
[ (14) holds by essentially applying the argument following (11) above to each k and l.]
[4] It follows from Corollary 2.5 that there exists a set S * ⊆ T l * and a simple S * -allocation
Now (12), (14), and the second statement in (15) together imply that for each
And, (13), (14), and (16) together imply that
[5] From (16) and the fact that each x k satisfies (7c) and (7d), we obtain the following for
[6] And, using (17) as well, we obtain a strict inequality for x
, it follows from inequalities (18) and (19) that
Thus x does not satisfy inequality (7a) with S = S * and π = π * . However, this contradicts that x is a feasible solution of CLIS(M). The contradiction is due to the assumption that at least one x k ∈ F is not a strict core allocation vector. Therefore each x k ∈ F must be a strict core allocation vector. As indicated at the end of [1], this completes the proof.
We should note that the proof for Lemma 8.2 does not assume the existence of a strict core allocation, but it only assumes the existence of a feasible solution of CLIS(M).
Hence it is clear from Lemma 8.2 that the following corollary holds: We remark that feasible (but not necessarily integral) solutions to (7a)-(7d) can be thought of as "fractional strict core outcomes", much in the spirit of Roth-Rothblum-Vande Vate (1993) for marriage games. The idea is that if x is such a solution, we can think of x ij as the percentage of time (in a time-sharing scenario) or the probability (in a lottery) that i receives house j. In the Roth-Rothblum-Vande Vate paper, the authors go on to show that under a suitably defined partial order, the set of fractional (strict) core matchings is a lattice. This partial order is interesting in the two-sided setup because the players in general rank different core outcomes differently. However, in our one-sided setup the players each rank all strict core outcomes the same (Theorem 7.4), so studying such a lattice structure is not an interesting problem. , namely, i∈S * j:j i π * (i) y ij = 0 < 1. This is a contradiction. Hence y must be a core allocation vector.
Proposition 9.1 means that each of the core allocation vectors corresponds to an extreme point of the feasible region of system (20a)-(20d). However, it is not true that all of the extreme points of the feasible region necessarily correspond to core allocations. We show this by the following example:
Example 9.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of players who have the following preferences:
(1) 3 1 2 1 1
